Some administration screw - ups are so epic that they require decades of effort . Such was the subject for the of late cancel architectural plan to convert surplus weapons - grade Pu into nuclear fuel . Not only did the U.S. squander $ 4 billion dollar bill , it increase the likelihood that terrorist could incur bomb - make materials .
It go like a good estimation at the beginning . Let ’s turn megaton into megawatt !
The United States settled on a plan to convert most of its excess atomic number 94 into fuel for nuclear reactors . A monumental reprocessing plant would be built at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina , which , during the Cold War , had refined atomic textile for deployment in warheads . Now , the site would have a new military mission : make nuclear fuel from a mix of atomic number 94 and uranium oxide , otherwise known as mixed oxide fuel , or MOX . Although atomic power plants in the U.S. function fuel made from low - enriched uranium ( LEU ) , other countries had demonstrated that MOX was a viable alternative .
Instead , the net effect was a mothball facility and a still - increase supplying of excess atomic number 94 . Like I say , this is n’t your distinctive government boondoggle . It was twenty years in the fashioning .
“A clear and present danger”
When Bill Clinton came to the White House , it became apparent to his organization that surplus weapons - grade plutonium would begin to pile up rapidly . The Start I and II treaties — along with unilateral pledges made between Presidents Bush , Gorbachev and Yeltsin — think of that thousand of atomic artillery would be retired within the 10 .
“ The existence of this nimiety stuff constitutes a percipient and present peril to national and international surety , ” warn a 1994reportpublished by the National Academy of Sciences . The more Pu we had lying around , the not bad the risk that it could be stolen and used by terrorist , or sold on the black - market to less - than - friendly countries . Although build a nuke with plutonium is more difficult than making one with highly enriched uranium ( HEU ) , less material is needed to create an explosion of equal size . too , radiological weapon ( “ dirty bombs ” ) that dispersed plutonium alternatively of HEU couldcausehundreds to thousands of additional cancer destruction .
Adding to the sentience of urgency were concerns over deteriorate security in the Russian Federation . Law - enforcement officials in Europe , the Caucasus and Central Asia were already reporting that they had intercepted diminished quantity of Pu being smuggled out of the former Soviet Union . Frank Von Hippel — the former Assistant Director for National Security in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy — recallswhat he saw when he visited a Russian plutonium storage facility in the Ural hatful :
I get going to one 50 - yr - old warehouse , one of the oldest building at the website and , you fuck , went — and detect 12,000 canisters , coffee can - sized cannister of plutonium there , 30,000 tons . So , you know , any two of these 12,000 case shot would be sufficient to make a Nagasaki - type bomb .
They had lots of guards around . There was even a fence around the metropolis . So , they were well - protected against some form of attack , you hump , the Green Berets or something like that , but they had almost no protection against an inner job . They had no surveillance , no television system cameras or detector inside the construction to detect if there was somebody in there that should n’t be .
In 1994 , Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin accord , in principle , to trammel and gradually reduce the U.S. and Russian stocks of military Pu . The question , still to be decided by the two nations , was how to get disembarrass of it ?
The National Academy of Sciences report recommended MOX as one of the least - worst options . Other state , notably France , already had facilities for process Pu into MOX , so it was a proven technology . The U.S. could likely build its own MOX facility within a decade .
But the write up also offered several caveat :
In the current nuclear fuel market , the use of atomic number 94 fuels is more often than not more expensive than the use of wide useable low - enrich uranium fuel — even if the plutonium itself is “ free”—because of the high fictionalisation cost resulting from plutonium ’s radiological toxicity and from the security measures guard required when handling it . As a termination , while most of the world ’s roughly 400 nuclear reactor could in principle burn plutonium in fuel containing a mixed bag of uranium and plutonium ( mixed - oxide or MOX fuel ) , few — and none in the United States — are currently license to do so .
Gaining permit and public approval could raise difficultness . The subsidy required to transform 50 short ton of Pu into spent fuel in this way ( compared to the cost of produce the same electricity by the mean value with which it would otherwise be produced ) would probably settle in the range from a few hundred million to a few billion dollars , depending on premise and on the specific approach choose .
There were other costs — and hazard — to consider . Here ’s the job with MOX : the plutonium is n’t really “ go ” until it ’s been irradiated in a nuclear exponent industrial plant . Before that pass off , the fuel still contains weapon - class plutonium that can be reclaimed . The “ reverse blending of Pu with uranium would only expect a modest capability for chemical substance processing that could be accomplished in a small - scale and easily concealable glovebox facility,”saysEd Lyman , a physicist at the Union for Concerned Scientists . Any reactor that used MOX fuel , therefore , would need to be heavy secured against intrusion and thievery .
And , pursuing the MOX choice could set up the wrong lesson for other countries . As a account by the Congressional Research Service hasnoted :
Some analysts have pick apart the MOX option on the rule of opposing any use of plutonium in power multiplication . From this power point of view , nations that do not possess nuclear weapons could utilise a plutonium - free-base fuel cycle for baron reactor as a blanket for develop nuclear weapon . If weapons states such as Russia and the United States used plutonium for power propagation , according to this debate , it would be more difficult to sway non - weapons states not to do so .
An alternative to MOX , also recommended by the National Academy of Sciences , was “ vitrification”—otherwise known as “ immobilization ” or “ can - in - canister . ” Pu would be blended with high - tier radioactive fluid waste and tot to molten trash , which would then solidify and be sealed within unstained brand stern . The stool , in turn , would be order inside untarnished steel canisters that would then be filled with yet another mess of molten , high - level radioactive permissive waste . Eventually , the case shot would be buried at a disposal site . The plutonium — engraft within this multi - layered , radioactive Matryoshka Doll — would be , in hypothesis , extremely difficult to regain .
The Russians want to breed
Over the next two years , the U.S. government reviewed 37 different strategy for disposing of plutonium ( including a proposal to film it into blank ) . Ultimately , though , the Clinton administration was inclined toward immobilization .
The Russians , however , want to go with MOX , which they saw as potential feedstock for stock breeder reactor .
A brief account here : Most nuclear power works ( include the 100 work in the United States ) utilize the “ once - through ” fuel rhythm — fuel rods undergo a controlled fission reaction to produce steam that ride turbine generators . The worn-out fuel rod are put back every 18 to 24 months , put into cool ponds , and then aim in teetotal storage until they can be buried .
Breeder reactors , by contrast , produce more fuel than they consume . The reactor core group is surrounded by a “ blanket ” of tubes containing non - fissionable U 238 , which capture neutrons escaping from the core and partially transubstantiate into fissionable atomic number 94 239 , which can then be extracted and reprocessed into more fuel .
Essentially , Moscow wanted to make MOX in edict to formulate a self - replenishing source of energy . Nikolai Yegorov , the lieutenant minister at Russia ’s Ministry of Atomic Energy , poke fun the American immobilization plan . “ If the United States wants to bemuse gold down the toilet , rent them , ” he said . But , “ spawn ” more plutonium did n’t sit well with the Clinton presidential term , which was render to concentrate the scourge of atomic proliferation . ( It was for that very reason that the Ford and Carter governing banned the use of the applied science in U.S. commercial-grade reactors 20 eld earlier . )
Still , the Clinton administration wanted to fall apart the stalemate with the Russians , and begin to explore the feasibility of develop MOX in the United States . As the New York Timesreportedin 1996 :
No U.S. reactors are presently license to be load up with plutonium fuel , and obtaining the necessary permits would almost certainly be politically troublesome .
The Energy Department says it would pay the utility for these ” irradiation services . ” It might grease one’s palms an exist nuclear reactor to do the job itself , if necessary .
The Nuclear Energy Institute , the civilian diligence ’s trade association , like the idea of using the plutonium in its nuclear reactor . It gauge that the plutonium could make enough reactor fuel , called mixed - oxide fuel and known as MOX , to run 10 large plants for 10 to 20 year .
But some analyst also opine the ” light beam services fees ” to American utilities would amount to a subsidy for uneconomical reactors .
” Pu is one of the most serious security threats facing the world , ” said Arjun Makhijani , President of the United States of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research , which has been scrutinise the government weapons program for more than a ten . ” What DOE is proposing will increase nuclear peril by entrench pork - barrel interest in atomic number 94 in Russia and creating them anew in the U.S. ”
A coalition of eight other groups , including Greenpeace , Physicians for Social Responsibility and the Nuclear Control Institute , say using military atomic number 94 in civilian plants would ” undermine a 20 - year United States policy to avoid the civilian enjoyment of atomic number 94 . ”
One year later , the U.S. and Russia make a via media :
Russia would change state its Pu into MOX fuel , but use most of it for “ once - through ” reactors .
The U.S. would assist fund the grammatical construction of the Russian MOX fuel plant .
Russia would be let to apply some of its MOX in experimental breeder reactors .
The U.S. would forgo the immobilizing choice for all but nine stacks of its surplus atomic number 94 .
This via media would become the basis for the terms formalized in the 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement between Washington and Moscow . But , it did n’t take long for the term to change .
Thinking outside the MOX
When George W. Bush arrived in the White House , his administration had an ambitious plan to revive the atomic power diligence in the U.S. while limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons afield .
It was called the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership ( GNEP ) . The design envisioned an external nuclear combine in which the United States and other fuel supplier nations — such as Russia , Britain , France , and Japan — would operate a fuel - leasing program . These supplier Nation would provide fresh fuel to conventional nuclear works in paying back for user nations agreeing to forego build their own fuel output facilities — which could also be used to make artillery - grade material .
A fundamental component of the GNEP proposal would be the construction of breeder nuclear reactor in the United States . Like the Russians , the Bush establishment now want to utilize MOX as feedstock . The White House anticipate , however , that America ’s stock breeder reactors would not produce Pu that could be used for nukes . These reactors would use a new , super - awing mental process to produce plutonium that could only be used as fuel . The process had been successfully tested on a science lab scale , and the White House had authority that it could be made to influence in the actual world . It just needed further development , at the monetary value of $ 1.06 billion .
Meanwhile , Russia — which the Bush brass envisioned as part of the GNEP cartel — was having 2d thinking about its 2000 accord with the United States . An investigative study put out by the Center for Public Integritydescribeswhat happened next :
Moscow had initially demand that Washington pay for most of the plutonium disposal project ’s expenses . But by 2007 , the United States had only managed to corral promises of $ 800 million in aid — $ 400 million in U.S. fund , and $ 400 million from its allies — while Russia estimated the amount it needed was $ 4 billion .
The shortfall reserve the Russians some wiggle elbow room . During this time period , a former U.S. negotiator recalled , the Russians were saying “ more and more , ‘ Look , we are willing to do it your fashion if we do n’t have to pay for it . But if we are snuff it to have to bear for it , we desire to do it our agency . ' ” Jerald Paul , principal deputy administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration [ NNSA ] from 2004 to 2006 , said “ the Russians were invariably impress the goalpost . ”
With a shortage of westerly aid and a raw pro - plutonium policy in Washington , Russia press to renegotiate the deal . At a confluence in Paris in Feb. 2005 , Russian atomic representation headman Alexander Rumyantsev told top Energy Department functionary that “ Russian plutonium disposition should be recast to focus on fast [ breeder ] reactors , ” according to a classified cable disclosed by Wikileaks .
His ambition was clear : Moscow want the Russian MOX plant life , financed by Washington , to make fuel not for received reactor , but for a full - weighing machine breeder political platform … The Bush administration fit — with little public notice — to countenance Russia renege on its original hope and burn its plutonium in two breeders — breeders that could produce more atomic number 94 .
In November 2007 , the U.S. and Russia signed a revised pact , which the Department of Energyextolledas “ measurable progress towards dispose of a pregnant amount of weapon - grade plutonium in Russia . ”
At around the same sentence , building of the MOX facility began at the Savannah River Site .
And GNEP ? An increasingly skeptical Congress abbreviate its backing , specially after atomic energy expertswarnedthat the final damage tag could rise as gamy as $ 100 billion . The program wasdeclared deadin 2009 .
Management Problems
In 2004 , the National Nuclear Security Administration estimated that the Savannah River MOX facility would cost $ 1.6 billion . Three years after , that estimate jump to $ 4.9 billion . In 2012 , the forecasted expenditure increased again , to $ 7.7 billion . By this clock time , $ 4 billion had already been spend and the project utilize more than 1,800 construction worker , designers and engineers . Then , in April 2013 , an internal recapitulation direct by the Department of Energy revealed that the entire lifespan operating cost of the facility — include construction , maintenance and administration of all the atomic number 94 — would be $ 24.2 billion .
The sticker shock absorber prompted the Department of Energy to mention in its Fiscal Year 2014budget requestthat , “ This current atomic number 94 temperament approach may be unaffordable … due to cost outgrowth and financial pressure . ”
Any lollygag doubts that the MOX program was on its last legs were dispelled when the Government Accountability Office ( GAO ) published areportin February 2014 . Even by GAO standards , the appraisal was scathing .
One of the self-aggrandising mistakes , according to the GAO , was confide this undertaking to the National Nuclear Security Administration , which is a semi - autonomous agency within the Department of Energy :
NNSA has not analyzed the underlying , or root , lawsuit of the Plutonium Disposition programme structure price increases to help name lessons learned and facilitate address the agency ’s trouble in complete undertaking within cost and schedule , which has moderate to NNSA ’s management of major projects remain on GAO ’s listing of areas at high peril of fraud , waste , abuse , and mismanagement .
Just one example of the short direction that direct to cost overrun : NNSA and its principal declarer underestimate the phone number of safety machine arrangement required to suffer Nuclear Regulatory Commission ( NRC ) requirement , which further increase equipment installation monetary value . More specifically , they were incognizant of the price associated with building a facility that could withstand an earthquake . The source of their confusion ? The MOX adeptness ’s design is based on a similar facility in France , but the NRC regulative requirements differ from those in France .
The Department of Energy was also at fault , because it approved the initial cost and schedule estimate , when the overall design of the MOX facility was only about 58 % staring .
A report publish two workweek ago by the Department ’s Inspector Generalnoted :
In a separate July 2006 memorandum to the NNSA Administrator , NNSA ’s Associate Administrator for Infrastructure and Environment expressed his business concern regarding the MOX Facility project . He expressed the belief that incomplete project provision could lead to an unintended “ excogitation - build - design ” process exchangeable to that experience by other major Departmental projects including the Waste Treatment Plant and the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility . The Waste Treatment Plant at the Hanford Site was given the commendation to start mental synthesis when the design was only about 45 percent accomplished . Since then , full labor costs for that installation have increased importantly and the project is well behind docket . He pointed out that , similarly , a comprehensive design review had not been conducted on the complete MOX Facility project and that the project had gamy - risk potential for increasing downstream cost and schedule .
The White House did its part , as well . In 2010 , President Obamaannounceda loanword guarantee of $ 8.3 billion to help the Southern Company work up two new nuclear reactors in Georgia . As a event , workers with nuclear technology design and manufacturing experience were dead in very gamey demand . The MOX grammatical construction site had an employee turnover of 20 % per twelvemonth because , after workers complete extra breeding at the Savannah River Site , they quit to take gamy pay jobs in Georgia . The U.S. government was subsidise its own labor shortage .
Finally , in March 2014 , the White House herald that it would put the whole projection on “ moth-eaten standby”—essentially , prepare it for shutdown — while the administration evaluated “ alternative plutonium temperament technologies to MOX that will achieve a safe and secure solution more quickly and be in effect . ”
Adding up the losses
MOX may be mothball , but the problem of what to do with our surplus weapon system - grade plutonium remains . And , despite cool relations between Washington and Moscow , the disposal correspondence still stand .
The Department of Energy has lay down a Plutonium Disposition Working Group that will spend the next 12 to 18 months trying to come up with a plan . you could see an initial workings paperhere . The options are depressingly similar to the ace paint a picture by the National Academy of Sciences , 20 years ago .
And even if it somehow croak Congress and got signed into a law by the president ; even if we stimulate this readiness up and crop , nobody want what it ’s make . The companies that tend commercial-grade atomic reactors havelost confidencein the program . They ca n’t be sure that it would provide a reliable , unwavering supply of fuel , or keep enough surplus fuel on hand in pillow slip it was need . And why would commercial atomic reactors buy MOX when low - enriched uranium is cheaper , gentle to transport and does n’t present a surety risk ? Adding to the mood of skepticism : a MOX fuel radiotherapy mental testing in a commercial-grade reactor had to be untimely terminated in 2008 because of unlooked-for problems .
The departure to the United States can be measured in more than the $ 4 billion to build up the facility and the hundreds of one thousand thousand of dollars sent to Russia to subsidise their program . The greater release is that the U.S. could have spend those funds to shore up other nonproliferation programs .
According to areportrecently publish by the Congressional Research Service :
An extra criticism of the [ MOX ] program from a nonproliferation perspective is that the high cost required to date for the plutonium temperament programme in the United States is funded out of the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget . There is business concern that money is being pick out away from other programs which some consider to have a more lineal impact on preventing the proliferation of weapons - usable atomic material . Programs summons let in the Second Line of Defense border security program or the Global Threat Reduction Initiative . Non - governmental nonproliferation expert have made recent public statement . For object lesson , Joe Cirincione of the Ploughshares Fund has say , “ funding for the atomic number 94 fuel deftness falls within the atomic nonproliferation budget . That means that every dollar mark spent on unneeded programs like MOX is one dollar less for vital non-proliferation programs that keep nuclear material and engineering out of the hands of terrorists . ”
If there ’s a success in all of this , it ’s Russia . According to the World Nuclear Association , Russia ’s building of one of its breeder reactor is “ well - in advance ” and it is “ subject of burning 1.7 measured tons of plutonium per year from razed artillery . ”
“ Russia does n’t intend to put away of its Pu permanently , ” Von Hippel told the Center for Public Integrity . “ In fact , it ’s typeset itself up to produce and recycle its plutonium indefinitely . ” That create risks “ that this stuff will get stolen , so in fact the certificate situation gets worse . ”
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